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Abstract 
Women are less competitive than men in most contexts studied. This difference has been 
linked to the gender gap in socio-economic outcomes. To examine whether this gender 
difference is linked to differential beliefs about competition, we developed a scale measuring 
lay beliefs about competition and tested whether these beliefs account for gender differences 
in competitive attitudes and behaviors. A mini meta-analysis (N = 2,331) of responses to this 
scale shows that men attribute more positive outcomes to competition than women. In 
particular, men are more likely to believe that competition improves performance, builds 
character, and leads to creative problem-solving. In contrast, the gender differences are 
smaller, less robust, and inconsistent for the different negative outcomes attributed to 
competition, such as encouraging unethical behavior, hurting self-esteem, and damaging 
relationships. We also show in two studies that only positive lay beliefs about competition 
predict competitive attitudes and behaviors, and account for (some of) the gender difference in 
competitiveness. We discuss possible reasons that women and men hold different beliefs 
about competition and the implications of these differences for the optimal design of social 
and organizational structures. 
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Lay Beliefs about Competition: Scale Development and Gender Differences 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines competitive as “strongly desiring to 
be more successful than others” (2011, p. 292). This definition is consistent with 
characterizations of competitiveness in the academic literature as “the enjoyment of 
interpersonal competition and the desire to win and be better than others” (Spence & 
Helmreich, 1983, p. 41; see also Johnson & Norem-Hebeisen, 1979; Smither & Houston, 
1992). Competitiveness is one mode of striving toward competence and achievement (Elliot, 
McGregor, & Thrash, 2002; Smither & Houston, 1992). It involves a tendency to define and 
seek achievement in comparison to other people, rather than one’s past levels of competence, 
ideals of excellence, or absolute task standards (Garcia, Tor, & Schiff, 2013; Spence & 
Helmreich, 1983).  
Competitive motivation is on average stronger in men than in women in most contexts 
studied, as suggested by both behavioral and self-report data, across the life-span and across 
cultures (Ahlgren & Johnson, 1979; Datta Gupta, Poulsen, & Villeval, 2013; Flory, 
Leibbrandt, & List, 2014; Lever, 1978; Lynn, 1993; Mayr, Wozniak, Davidson, Kuhns, & 
Harbaugh, 2012; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011; Schneider, Woodburn, del Toro, & Udvari, 
2005; Spence & Helmreich, 1983; Sutter, & Glätzle-Rützler, 2014). Recent findings in labor 
economics suggest that this gender difference in competitiveness may partly explain the 
gender gap in socio-economic outcomes, because competitiveness is linked with favorable 
socio-economic outcomes (e.g., Buser, Niederle, & Oosterbeek, 2014; Kanthak & Woon, 
2015; Kleinjans, 2009; Preece & Stoddard, 2015). For example, gender differences in 
competitiveness explained 10% of the gender gap in earnings nine years later among 
graduates of a top MBA program (Reuben, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2015), and 50% of the 
promotion gap between female and male economists in France (Bosquet, Combes, & García-
Peñalosa, 2017).  
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In light of these findings linking competitive motivation to the gender gap in socio-
economic outcomes, we believe it is important to better understand the psychology of the 
motivation to compete, particularly with respect to gender. To this purpose, we have studied 
the beliefs people hold about interpersonal competition, how the genders differ in the beliefs 
they endorse, and how these beliefs are associated with competitiveness.  
Lay Beliefs and Competitiveness 
Lay beliefs are systems of interconnected beliefs that people hold about a domain 
(Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001). Such belief systems have been called by various labels 
such as lay theories, implicit theories, mindsets, naïve theories, folk theories, or mental 
models. Despite the terminological profusion, these constructs all capture the cognitions by 
which people understand the workings of the social and natural world (Wegener & Petty, 
1998). Following the cognitive revolution in psychology, researchers have become 
increasingly interested in studying belief systems about diverse domains such as achievement 
motivation (Dweck, 1999), causes of human action (Malle & Knobe, 1997; Morris & Peng, 
1994), causes of achievement (Weiner, 1985), self-control (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010), 
emotions (Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007), and justice (Lerner, 1980), among others. 
Together, these diverse lines of research have shown that people organize meaning around 
belief systems, which then guide cognition, affect, motivation, and action (Molden & Dweck, 
2006). Consequently, lay beliefs have been linked to expectations, perceptions, information 
processing, judgments, decisions, self-regulation, and behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 2012; Burnette, 
O’Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack, & Finkel, 2013; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002).  
In line with the evidence linking lay beliefs to various psychological and behavioral 
outcomes, we propose that reactions to competitive situations are a function of people’s lay 
beliefs about competition, which we define as their beliefs on the potentially positive or 
negative outcomes of competing with other people.  
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Lay beliefs about competition may capture how competition is good and useful (e.g., 
“Competition makes you work harder and improve your performance”), or why it is bad and 
potentially destructive (e.g., “Competition makes people lie, cheat, and trample on others to 
get ahead”). We posit that lay beliefs about competition organize the meanings people assign 
to competition, their willingness to compete, and how they process information and regulate 
themselves under competition. On this basis, we expect that the gender difference in 
competitiveness would be accompanied by a gender difference in lay beliefs about 
competition that are differentially available and accessible to the two genders.  
How Can Studying Lay Beliefs Further Our Understanding of Competitiveness? 
To date, various disciplines have contributed to the study of the gender difference in 
competitiveness. These include evolutionary perspectives linking it to the distinct selective 
pressures faced by the two sexes (Geary, 2010), anthropological perspectives linking it to 
patriarchal social order (Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy, List, & Maximiano, 2013; Gneezy, 
Leonard, & List, 2009), and sociological perspectives linking it to family socio-economic 
status (Almås, Cappelen, Salvanes, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2016) or the gender composition 
of the socializing environment (Booth & Nolen, 2012, cf. Lee, Niederle, Kang, 2014). 
Behavioral economists have focused on psychological factors, showing that men’s greater 
confidence partly explains their greater willingness to enter competitions, but risk preferences 
or other-regarding preferences do not (for a review, see Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011). In 
social psychology, Role Congruity Theory has suggested that the gender difference in 
competition-related traits, such as assertiveness and dominance, are due to the economic and 
domestic roles that the two sexes are typically asked to play, and the power differences they 
entail (Eagly & Wood, 1999).  
We believe that a study of lay beliefs would add to and complement these perspectives 
by revealing the underlying cognitive structures accompanying competitiveness, and 
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advancing new research directions. First, if we find gender differences in lay beliefs about 
competition, we can next ask whether they partly cause the gender difference in 
competitiveness. Previous research has established a causal role for some lay beliefs by 
manipulating them and producing behavioral change, in domains including academic 
performance (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007), 
negotiation outcomes (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007), dieting success (Burnette & Finkel, 2012), 
and physical endurance (Weinberg, Gould, Yukelson, & Jackson, 1981). Studying lay beliefs 
can thus help uncover one source of the gender difference in competitiveness. 
Second, exploring lay beliefs about competition could help us understand why women 
and men prefer different types of organizations and socio-economic institutions. Belief 
systems are at the foundation of worldviews that shape social institutions (Jost, Ledgerwood, 
& Hardin, 2007), and people defend existing political and social orders by holding on to the 
beliefs that justify them (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kay et al., 2009; Lerner, 
1980). Beliefs about the merits and demerits of competition may similarly be used to justify 
pedagogical choices at home and in educational settings, organizational designs, and 
economic systems (Hayward & Kemmelmeier, 2007; Kohn, 1992). By studying lay beliefs 
about competition, we could thus move toward a deeper understanding of ideological and 
institutional choices, and their variation by gender. 
Third, knowledge of the gender differences in lay beliefs about competition would 
generate novel questions and testable hypotheses about the gendered experience of 
competition. If we grant that beliefs are partly shaped by prior experiences, we would be 
justified in asking whether gender differences in competition-related beliefs correspond to 
actual gender differences in the experience of competition or differences in the socialization 
experiences of girls and boys. This would allow us to develop better targeted hypotheses 
regarding the sources of the gender difference in the desire to compete. 
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Measuring Lay Beliefs about Competition 
In sum, studying lay beliefs about competition promises a richer understanding of the 
gender difference in competitiveness, and novel fronts for future exploration. Toward this 
purpose, the initial requirement is measuring people’s lay beliefs about competition reliably 
and validly. We thus first searched the literature for a suitable instrument.  
Competition-related instruments in the extant literature typically assess people’s 
competitiveness with items such as “I enjoy competing against an opponent” or “I feel that 
winning is important in both work and games” (Gill & Deeter, 1988; Helmreich & Spence, 
1978; Johnson & Norem-Hebeisen, 1979; Smither & Houston, 1992). While such instruments 
typically do not probe into underlying beliefs, one exception is the Personal Development 
Competitive Attitude Scale (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczor, & Gold, 1996), which was 
developed to distinguish between hypercompetitiveness and healthier forms of 
competitiveness that might serve personal development. Even though some items on this scale 
assess competition-related beliefs, the scale is not adequate for our purposes because it does 
not capture the full range of lay beliefs about competition. A second difficulty it poses is that 
many items on the scale are double-barreled, such that they simultaneously ask about 
evaluations of competition and endorsement of a specific belief (e.g., “I like competition 
because it teaches me a lot about myself”). For these items, it is unclear whether respondents 
are rating their liking of competition, their endorsement of the specific belief, or some 
combination of the two. 
Other research has used single-item measures such as the one included in the World 
Values Survey from 1990 onward. This item asked respondents to locate their position 
between two ends of a continuum, with one end labeled “Competition is good. It stimulates 
people to work hard and develop new ideas,” and the other end labeled “Competition is bad. It 
brings out the worst in people.” Even though this item has been fruitfully used to study the 
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individual and country-level factors predicting positive evaluations of competition 
(Gorodnichenko, & Roland, 2011; Hayward & Kemmelmeier, 2007), it is not adequate for our 
purposes because the scale anchors are again double-barreled, and the item does not 
necessarily cover the full range of beliefs people may hold about competition. This item also 
places positive and negative beliefs (and evaluations) onto a single dimension. In fact, 
positive and negative beliefs about competition are likely to have some degree of 
independence, as attitudes often derive from separate positive and negative components 
(Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997). In other words, people may simultaneously maintain 
positive and negative beliefs about competition. 
Our review of the literature thus led us to conclude that we could not systematically, 
validly, and reliably measure lay beliefs about competition with existing measures, and a 
novel instrument was necessary. Our first task thus was to develop an instrument that would 
(1) capture the full variety of beliefs people hold about competition, (2) disentangle beliefs 
about competition from evaluations of competition, and (3) allow for independence between 
positive and negative beliefs about competition.  
Overview 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, in Study 1, we describe the 
development and validation of a scale measuring lay beliefs about competition which we call 
the Lay Beliefs about Competition Scale. In Studies 2 and 3, we use this scale to test for 
gender differences in lay beliefs about competition and examine whether these beliefs account 
for gender differences in competitive attitudes and behaviors. Finally, we conduct a mini 
meta-analysis on the gender differences in lay beliefs about competition. 
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Study 1 
 We developed and validated the scale in three steps. First, we mapped the content 
domain. Then, we generated items based on the mapping and selected the best items. Finally, 
we tested the internal reliability of the scale. 
Step 1: Content Domain Mapping  
To capture the range of beliefs about competition held by lay people, we recruited 230 
participants on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (52% female, Mage = 35.8, SDage = 11.8, 
range: 19-82), who were paid $0.80. Participants responded to two open-ended questions 
probing their beliefs about competition, presented in random order. One question was “Please 
think about competition among individuals. What is good and positive about it? Please list all 
of your ideas, and why you think as you do.” The other question replaced “What is good and 
positive about it?” with “What is bad and negative about it?”  
To analyze the content domain, participants’ responses were broken down into 957 
separate idea units. An attempt to categorize these units by two of the authors led to three 
conceptually coherent subcategories of positive beliefs and three conceptually coherent 
subcategories of negative beliefs about competition. The three categories about positive 
aspects of competition were as follows: 
1) Competition boosts motivation and performance. This category included beliefs 
about competition’s role in motivating people to succeed, pushing them to try hard 
and achieve more. Sample participant statements falling in this category include 
“Competition creates an urge to succeed,” it “makes people set higher goals,” 
“helps individuals to reach their potential,” and “brings out the best results and 
best efforts among the individuals who participate.”   
2) Competition builds character and raises self-esteem. This category captured 
beliefs about competition’s potential role in developing character, imparting 
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values, and allowing people to build up self-esteem. Sample statements include 
“Competition teaches you how to gracefully handle a win,” it “helps build 
personality and determination,” and it “can help grow confidence and self-esteem.” 
3) Competition spurs innovative solutions. This category included beliefs about 
competition’s role in driving people to innovate and be creative in order to win. 
Sample statements include “Competition fosters creative thought, ingenuity, and 
progress,” it “can create new ideas or ways of doing things as people look for new 
ways to win,” and it “can help come up with many different and new ideas.”  
Beliefs about negative aspects of competition were categorized into the following 
three categories: 
1) Competition may encourage unethical behavior. This category included beliefs 
about competition’s potential role in leading people to act unethically, cheat, and 
deceive in order to win. Sample participant statements include, “Competition can 
bring out the worst in people. People get so tied up in winning sometimes that they 
don't care how they win, or who they hurt,” “[Competition] causes people to be 
ruthless and do things without considering the outcome for others,” and “If push 
comes to shove, people involved may even be forced to engage in illegal, immoral, 
or unethical acts in order for them to get ahead.” 
2) Competition may hurt self-esteem. This category included beliefs about 
competition’s potential role in hurting people’s self-esteem, creating self-doubt, 
and discouraging them from trying again. Sample statements include “Competition 
can be very negative because many people can become really depressed as they 
compare themselves to others,” “For some people with low self-esteem, 
competition and losing may even further hurt their self-esteem,” and “Never 
winning can make you not want to do better but make you give up.”  
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3) Competition may damage relationships. This category included beliefs about the 
potentially negative interpersonal consequences of competition. Sample statements 
include “Competition can lead to jealousy and hatred,” “Taken to extremes, 
[competition] can poison relationships, in that one begins to regard others as 
obstacles and enemies,” and “[Competition] can cloud any idea of shared or 
collaborative goals.” 
Step 2: Item Generation and Reduction 
For each of the six belief categories listed above, we next created 5 to 11 items, 
totalling 50 items, by taking participants’ exact statements from Step 1 or paraphrasing them 
for clarity and concision.  
This initial set of 50 items was reduced to 18 items over two iterations of testing and 
elimination. In the first iteration, 535 U.S. citizens recruited on MTurk (41% female; Mage = 
32.6, SDage = 10.5, range: 18-75) indicated their agreement with each of the 50 items in 
exchange for $0.70. Out of this set, we selected 24 items that correlated highly with other 
items in the same subcategory but were not conceptually redundant with them, and correlated 
less strongly with items from other subcategories of the same valence. Using these 24 items, 
we ran a second iteration with 302 U.S. citizens recruited on MTurk (39% female; Mage = 
34.6, SDage = 11.5, range: 18-73), and paid them $0.70. Following the same procedure as 
before, we reduced the final number of items to 18, with 3 items for each subcategory. The 18 
items comprising the final scale are presented in Table 1. 
Step 3: Testing the Internal Reliability of the Scale 
We next tested the factor structure of the scale for internal reliability. Specifically, we 
asked whether positive belief items separate from the negative belief items, whether the three 
subcategories of positive and negative belief subscales each constitute distinct factors from 
one another, and whether the factor structure of the scale is gender invariant. We ran these 
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tests on four samples to increase the generalizability of the results with respect to age, 
nationality, socio-economic background, and work experience. The samples also differed in 
whether participants responded to both subscales for positive and negative beliefs about 
competition, or only to one of them. 
Methods 
In this and all subsequent studies in this research, all sample sizes were pre-
determined, aiming for the highest sample sizes given our resource constraints, no 
manipulations were used, no data exclusions were used beyond those specified, all analyzed 
variables are reported, and no analyses were conducted before the data collection was 
completed. For all MTurk studies, we took steps to prevent participation by individuals who 
had taken part in a prior study. 
Participants  
Sample 1. The survey was completed by 758 adults recruited on MTurk (45% female; 
M age = 33.3, SD age = 11.1, range: 18-74; 76% White, 9% Asian, 7% African, 5% Hispanic, 
and 3% other; all U.S. citizens) for $1.00. Seventy-six percent of participants were employed, 
and 98% had previous work experience.  
Sample 2. Participants were recruited on Prolific, a crowdsourcing platform located in 
the U.K. that had over 30,000 online workers across the world at the time of data collection. A 
total of 441 adults (Mage = 30.9, SDage = 11.2, range: 1772; 48% female; 80% White, 10% 
Asian, 3% African, 2% Hispanic, and 5% other) participated in the survey for £0.35. Seventy-
two percent of participants were employed, and 94% had previous work experience. Fifty 
percent of participants had British nationality, 33% U.S. or Canadian nationality, 6% 
European nationalities, 5% South Asian nationalities, 3% South American nationalities, 2% 
African nationalities, and 1% East Asian nationalities.  
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Sample 3. A total of 132 adults recruited on MTurk (Mage = 33.6, SDage = 11.2, range: 
1864; 46% female; 73% White, 11% Asian, 8% African, 7% Hispanic, and 1% other; all 
U.S. citizens) participated in the survey for $1.00. Seventy-six percent of participants were 
employed, and 97% had previous work experience. 
Sample 4. Participants were recruited through a marketing intelligence agency located 
in the U.S. that has contacts in multiple companies across industries. A total of 502 adults 
(Mage = 44.2, SDage = 13.2, range: 2078; 48% female; 82% White, 9% African, 4% Hispanic, 
3% Asian, and 2% other) participated in the survey for $2.25. All participants resided in the 
U.S., and 89% were employed. All participants had previous work experience (99% as full-
time employees). The median annual household income was between $25,000 and $100,000 
for 66% of the sample, below $25,000 for 12% of the sample, and above $100,000 for 22% of 
the sample.  
Measures 
Lay beliefs about competition. We measured participants’ lay beliefs about 
competition with the final 18 item measure comprised of 9 items representing three 
subcategories for positive beliefs, and 9 items representing three subcategories for negative 
beliefs. We henceforth call the subcategories of positive beliefs about competition 
performance increase, personal growth, and innovation. The three subcategories of negative 
beliefs about competition we henceforth call unethical behavior, self-damage, and relational 
damage.  
Participants in Samples 1 and 2 were randomly assigned to respond to either the 
positive beliefs or negative beliefs subscale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). 
Participants in Samples 3 and 4 responded to both the positive and negative beliefs subscales. 
Item order was randomized in all samples. We included either the positive or the negative 
beliefs subscale in Samples 1 and 2 because we worried about potential carry-over effects 
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from one subscale to the other. In the latter two samples (Samples 3 and 4), we included both 
subscales because we wanted to know how they relate to each other.  
Results and Discussion 
We tested the factor structure of the scale in three ways. We first report tests for a 
separation between positive and negative belief subscales. We then report goodness of fit tests 
for the proposed three-factor structures. Finally, we report tests examining the scale’s factor 
structure invariance across gender.  
Testing for separation between positive and negative belief subscales. The average 
correlation between the positive and negative belief subscales was -.51 for Sample 3 and -.44 
for Sample 4 (ps < .001), indicating that positive and negative beliefs share common variance, 
but are still distinct. To formally test for a separation between the positive and negative 
subscales, we ran two separate confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) models, one with a single 
factor for all items, and one with two factors for positive and negative subscales each, using 
an oblique rotation. The model with two factors provided a substantially better fit to the data 
than the model with a single factor across both samples; Sample 3: Δχ2(1) = 407.95, p < .01; 
Sample 4: Δχ2 (1) = 1576.39, p < .01. These results show that the positive and negative beliefs 
about competition are empirically separate. 
Testing for factor structures of the positive and negative subscales. We next tested 
whether the three categories under the positive and negative belief subscales can each be 
treated as distinct content domains. To this purpose, we set up oblique 3-factor models for 
positive and negative beliefs about competition, respectively. We posited 3 latent factors 
under positive beliefs (performance increase, personal growth, and innovation), and 3 latent 
factors under negative beliefs (unethical behavior, self-damage, and relational damage). See 
Figures 1a and 1b.  
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We performed a CFA with maximum likelihood estimation using AMOS 23.0 
(Arbuckle, 2014). To evaluate the model fit, we used normed chi-square (χ2/df), the 
standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR), the root-mean-square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), and comparative fit index (CFI). Models with good fit satisfy all or most of the 
following criteria: a normed chi-square value (χ2/df) less than 5.0 (Wheaton et al., 1977), 
SRMR < .08, RMSEA < .06, and CFI > .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
As indicated in Tables 2a and 2b, the three-factor models for both positive and 
negative beliefs had good fit across all four samples. We next tested whether the three-factor 
models provided better fit to the data than a single-factor model or two-factor models in which 
two subcategories load on one factor and the remaining subcategory is a factor on its own. 
The three-factor model fit the data significantly better than the competing single- or two-
factor models across all four samples (see Tables 2a and 2b). This indicates that people hold 
partly independent beliefs about various positive aspects and various negative aspects of 
competition. 
Because the analyses showed the three-factor models to have good fit to the data, we 
examined factor loadings for each subcategory of positive and negative beliefs. For all items, 
factor loadings were significant and relatively high (all standardized estimates above .67, ps < 
.001). Loadings for each item across the four samples are available in Figures 1a and 1b. 
Table 3 presents means and standard deviations for scales and subscales across all 3 our 
studies, Table 4a presents correlations among subscales, and Table 4b presents inter-item 
correlations. 
Testing for gender invariance in factor structure. Given our objective of studying 
gender differences in beliefs about competition, we sought to determine whether the scale 
captured similar belief structures in women and men. To this purpose, we conducted a multi-
group structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis in AMOS, with gender as our grouping 
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variable. We tested whether allowing differential factor loadings for the two genders (the 
unconstrained model) would lead to a better model fit than setting factor loadings to be equal 
across the two genders (the constrained model).  
The results of the multi-group analysis are presented in Table 5. For negative beliefs, 
the unconstrained model did not fit the data significantly better in any of the 4 samples (see 
Table 5 for details). For positive beliefs, the unconstrained model, which allowed for different 
loadings for the two genders, did not provide a significantly better fit to the data in 3 out of 
the 4 samples, suggesting that the positive beliefs scale has satisfactory structural invariance 
for gender. However, the unconstrained model provided a better fit in Sample 1. This was a 
sample in which participants responded only to the positive beliefs subscale or only to the 
negative beliefs subscale.  
Overall, these analyses suggest that the scale has satisfactory structural invariance for 
the two genders and is a suitable instrument for measuring gender differences when the two 
scales are presented together. This is what we did in Studies 2 and 3, as described next.  
Study 2 
Having developed a scale to measure lay beliefs about competition, we turned to 
examining gender differences in the endorsement of these beliefs. Study 2 tested whether 
women and men differ in their lay beliefs about competition, and if so, whether the difference 
would account for the gender difference in competitiveness.  
Study 2 also provided an opportunity to obtain evidence of the scale’s convergent and 
discriminant validity, i.e., whether it is more strongly related to measures of theoretically 
relevant constructs than to theoretically distant constructs (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). To this 
purpose, participants responded to two measures of domain-general competitiveness (Johnson 
& Norem-Hebeisen, 1979; Helmreich & Spence, 1978), a measure of preference for 
competitive work environments (Fletcher & Nusbaum, 2010), and a measure of 
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hypercompetitiveness (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczor, & Gold, 1990). Because all three 
constructs entail competitive attitudes, and because attitudes are partly based on beliefs 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974), we expected all constructs to be empirically related to lay beliefs 
about competition. We expected the strongest association for domain-general competitiveness, 
and we expected descriptively weaker relationships for hypercompetitiveness and preference 
for competitive work environments, which have additional conceptual components beyond 
domain-general competitiveness. 
Methods 
Participants. A total of 340 undergraduates (Mage = 19.7, SDage = 1.7, range: 1835; 
63% female; 44% White, 34% Asian, 10% Hispanic, and 7% African) in an introductory-level 
psychology course at a U.S. university participated in the survey for extra course credit.1 
Eighty-three percent of participants had full- or part-time work experience.  
Procedure and measures. The study was conducted in three sessions over the course 
of 12 days. In the first session, participants completed our scale assessing lay beliefs about 
competition. In the second session one week later, they completed the two scales measuring 
domain-general competitiveness and the scale measuring hypercompetitiveness described 
below. At the third session five days later, they completed the scale measuring preference for 
competitive work environments.  
Lay Beliefs about Competition Scale. We used the 18 items of the Lay Beliefs about 
Competition scale to measure participants’ positive beliefs about competition (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .86) and negative beliefs about competition (Cronbach’s alpha = .88).  
                                                          
1 The data for this study were collected in the context of a larger project (Author names 
removed for masked review). None of the findings from the research herein have been 
presented in any prior work.  
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Domain-general competitiveness. To measure participants’ domain-general 
competitiveness, we used two scales. The first was Johnson and Norem-Hebeisen’s (1979) 8-
item competitive interdependence scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .87; 7-point scale: 1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree) which measures the extent to which individuals enjoy and 
value competition (e.g., “Competing with others is a good way to work”) and winning in 
competition (e.g., “I like to be the best in the group I am in”). The second measure of 
competitiveness was the 5-item competitiveness subscale of Helmreich and Spence’s (1978) 
Work and Family Orientation Questionnaire (Cronbach’s alpha = .79; 5-point scale: 1 = 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). These items similarly measure the extent to which 
individuals enjoy competitive situations (e.g., “I enjoy working in situations involving 
competition with others”) and value winning in competition (e.g., “I feel that winning is 
important in both work and games”).  
After standardizing the scores, we combined these scales into a single composite 
measure of domain-general competitiveness, because they cover the same conceptual ground 
and their items are correlated moderately to strongly, with a median inter-item correlation 
coefficient of .41. The combined scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .91.  
Hypercompetitiveness. Hypercompetitiveness is defined as an indiscriminate need to 
compete and win by any means, including manipulation, aggression and exploitation (Horney, 
1937; Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczor, & Gold, 1990). To measure hypercompetitiveness, we 
used the 26-item Hypercompetitive Attitude Scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .84; 5-point scale: 1 = 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) developed by Ryckman and colleagues (1990). This 
scale measures the extent to which individuals have extremely competitive attitudes (e.g., “I 
compete with others even if they are not competing with me”) and may be willing to impose 
costs on others to win (e.g., “If I can disturb my opponent in some way in order to get the 
edge in competition, I will do so”). 
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Preference for competitive work environments. To measure participants’ preference 
for working in competitive workplaces, we adapted Fletcher and Nusbaum’s (2010) 20-item 
Competitive Work Environment scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .96; 7-point scale, 1 = not at all 
true of me to 7 = extremely true of me). This scale captures a preference for workplaces in 
which rewards, recognition and status are allocated based on competition among coworkers, 
with items such as “In the future, I would like to work in environments in which my coworkers 
and I would be compensated (e.g., pay, bonuses) based on our performance relative to others” 
and “In the future, I would like to work in environments in which I would be acknowledged for 
my accomplishments only when I outperform my coworkers.” 
Results  
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations among variables, and 
Tables 7a and 7b present descriptive and inferential statistics on gender differences for all 
samples. In order to avoid alpha error inflation, in the remainder of the paper, we report p-
values only for tests which are grounded in our theoretical framework or previous empirical 
research. These include tests of gender differences in competitiveness, tests of gender 
differences in the positive and negative beliefs about competition, and mediational tests for 
the gender effects on competitiveness via positive and negative beliefs about competition.  
Gender differences in lay beliefs about competition. We first tested for gender 
differences in lay beliefs about competition. Gender predicted the endorsement of positive 
beliefs about competition, such that men endorsed significantly more positive beliefs (M = 
5.43, SD = 0.76) than did women (M = 5.18, SD = 0.81); t(338) = 2.74, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 
0.31. In contrast, gender did not significantly predict the endorsement of negative beliefs 
about competition by men (M = 4.21, SD = 0.99) versus women (M = 4.05, SD = 1.01); t(338) 
= 1.42, p = .16, Cohen’s d = 0.16.  
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Mediation of the gender difference in domain-general competitiveness by lay 
beliefs. We next tested whether competition-related beliefs would account for the gender 
difference in domain-general competitiveness. Consistent with prior research, women in our 
sample reported significantly lower levels of competitiveness (M = -0.82, SD = 0.71) than did 
men (M = 0.14, SD = 0.65); t(328) = 2.79, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.32. To test the mediating 
role of positive beliefs about competition in this gender difference, we used the PROCESS 
macro (Hayes, 2013, Model 4) and calculated bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CIs) 
with 10,000 resamples for the indirect effect of participant gender on competitiveness via 
positive beliefs about competition. Supporting the mediating role of positive beliefs, the 95% 
CI did not include 0 [0.04, 0.16].  
We also tested for the mediating effect of negative beliefs about competition. 
Consistent with the absence of a gender difference in the endorsement of negative beliefs 
about competition, negative beliefs did not significantly mediate the relationship between 
gender and competitiveness; 95% CI: [-0.06, 0.004]. 
Mediation of the gender difference in hypercompetitiveness by lay beliefs. The 
levels of hypercompetitive attitudes reported by women (M = 2.77, SD = 0.53) did not 
significantly differ from the levels reported by men (M = 2.87, SD = 0.47); t(328) = 1.78, p = 
.08, Cohen’s d = 0.21. Using the same method above, we found that positive beliefs mediated 
the gender difference in hypercompetitive attitudes (95% CI: [0.01, 0.07]). No significant 
mediating effect was observed via the negative beliefs scale.  
Mediation of the gender difference in preference for competitive work 
environments by lay beliefs. Women reported significantly lower levels of preference for 
competitive work environments (M = 3.38, SD = 1.25) than did men (M = 3.73, SD = 1.22); 
t(325) = 2.49, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.28. Using the same method above, we found that 
positive beliefs mediated the gender difference in preference for competitive work 
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environments (95% CI: [0.02, 0.16]). No significant mediating effect was observed via the 
negative beliefs scale. 
Evidence on the scale’s convergent and discriminant validity. The results also 
supported the scale’s construct validity by showing that it is empirically related to, and can 
discriminate between, theoretically more and less distant constructs. As predicted, beliefs 
about competition were associated with all three constructs, and this relationship was 
descriptively strongest for domain-general competitiveness. Domain-general competitiveness 
correlated .42 (p < .01) with positive beliefs about competition and -.15 (p = .01) with 
negative beliefs about competition. In contrast, hypercompetitiveness significantly correlated 
only with positive beliefs about competition (r = .22, p < .01) and had a near-zero correlation 
with negative beliefs about competition (r = .06, p = .27). Similarly, preference for 
competitive workplaces significantly correlated only with positive beliefs about competition 
(r = .18, p < .01) and had a near-zero correlation with negative beliefs about competition (r = -
.06, p = .32).  
Discussion 
Study 2 found that women are less likely than men to believe that competition 
produces positive outcomes. We did not find evidence supporting that women are more likely 
to believe than men that competition produced negative outcomes. Moreover, positive but not 
negative beliefs accounted for the gender difference in competitiveness, as measured by a 
domain-general competitiveness measure, and two measures that partially tap competitive 
motivations. 
The mediational analyses suggest that positive lay beliefs about competition may play 
a causal role in competitiveness. At the same time, the correlational nature of the data implies 
that causality may also run in the opposite direction. To probe this possibility, we conducted 
reverse mediational analyses, in which the gender difference in positive beliefs about 
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competition was mediated through competitiveness. The results supported the possibility of 
reverse mediation, with the 95% CI not including 0 for domain-general competitiveness [0.03, 
0.19], hypercompetitiveness [0.001, 0.09], and preference for competitive work environments 
[0.006, 0.09]. We discuss possible causal pathways in the General Discussion.  
Study 3 
In Study 3, we sought to further examine gender differences in lay beliefs about 
competition and test whether these differences would account for the gender difference in 
competitiveness. This time, we used a behavioral measure of competitiveness. We also 
introduced a one-month lag between the measurement of beliefs and competitive behaviors. 
This lag allowed us to test the predictive utility of the scale across a one-month period, as well 
as the test-retest reliability of the scale. Even though people’s beliefs about competition may 
change over time, the change expected within a month is negligible. Therefore, measurements 
taken one month apart should be highly correlated if the scale satisfactorily captures people’s 
beliefs about competition. In contrast, the measurements should correlate only weakly, or not 
at all, if the scale does not capture a meaningful and relatively stable individual difference. 
Methods 
Participants. In the first round of testing we recruited, on MTurk, 907 native English 
speakers living in the U.S. Of these participants, 758 completed the second round as well 
(retention rate: 84%).2 We excluded from analyses 4 participants who reported inconsistent 
gender information across the two rounds, leaving 754 individuals in the final sample (48% 
                                                          
2 We tested whether participants who participated in the second round were different from 
those who did not. The two groups did not differ in gender composition [χ2(1) = 0.55, p = 
.47], average endorsement of positive beliefs about competition [F(1, 901) = 0.30, p = .86], or 
average endorsement of negative beliefs about competition [F(1, 901) < 0.01, p = .95]. 
However, participants who did participate in the second round were significantly older (M = 
37.0, SD = 11.8) than participants who did not complete the second round, (M = 32.0, SD = 
10.2), F(1, 901) = 23.3, p < .01.  
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female; Mage = 37.0, SDage = 11.8, range: 1874; 82% White, 6% Asian, 6% African 
American, 4% Hispanic, and 2% other). At the initial round, 66% of the participants were 
employed full-time, 16% were employed part-time, and 18% were unemployed. Only one 
percent of participants reported not having had any prior work experience.  
Participants were paid $0.75 for the first round of the study. For the second round, 
they were paid a $0.80 base rate and a $0.20 bonus. 
Procedure and measures. In the first round, participants responded to the18 items of 
the Lay Beliefs about Competition Scale, presented in random order. They then reported their 
gender, age, race, and employment information. A month after the first round, we contacted 
participants who completed the first round and invited them to participate in a study. The 
invitation message stated that they qualified for a new study, without making any reference to 
the initial study. Upon starting the second round, participants were told that they were going 
to complete a task and would be paid a bonus based on their performance. The instructions 
did not specify what kind of task was awaiting them. Our behavioral measure of 
competitiveness was whether participants would choose to have their bonus depend on their 
competitive or absolute performance. Participants were told:  
If you choose the first option, your bonus will depend on how your performance 
compares with other participants who complete this task (i.e., your competitive 
performance).  
If you choose the second option, your bonus will depend on how you perform on the 
task in absolute terms, regardless of other participants’ performance. 
Participants were then asked to make a choice between the two options before 
proceeding to the task. After participants indicated whether they wanted to compete or not, 
they were given a short typing task (61 words). This was a filler task to support the cover 
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story and we did not conduct any analyses on it. Finally, participants completed the Lay 
Beliefs about Competition Scale in random order. 
Results 
Gender differences in lay beliefs about competition. We first tested for gender 
differences in beliefs about competition, using scores averaged across the two rounds of 
measurement. Consistent with Study 2 findings, men reported stronger endorsement of 
positive beliefs (M = 5.64, SD = 0.81) than did women (M = 5.35, SD = 0.94); t(752) = 4.48, p 
< .01, Cohen’s d = 0.33. In contrast, there was no significant gender difference in the 
endorsement of negative competition-related beliefs reported by men (M = 3.96, SD = 1.11) 
versus women (M = 3.95, SD = 1.19); t(752) = 0.09, p = .93, Cohen’s d ~ 0. Please refer to 
Tables 7a and 7b for gender differences in belief subcategories, which we will discuss in more 
detail later.  
Predictive utility of lay beliefs. To test the predictive utility of lay beliefs, we 
examined whether participants’ beliefs reported in the first round predicted their choice to 
enter a competition a month later. We found that positive beliefs about competition at Time 1 
predicted willingness to compete a month later. A logistic regression model with positive 
beliefs was significantly better at predicting the choice to compete than a constant-only 
model; χ2(1) = 9.95, p < .01. At 1 standard deviation below the mean value of positive beliefs, 
the odds of choosing to compete was 24%. These odds rose to 35% at 1 standard deviation 
above the mean value. There was no significant relationship between competition entry and 
the negative beliefs subscale; χ2(1) = 0.069, p = .79.  
Mediation of the gender difference in competitive choices by lay beliefs. We next 
analyzed whether lay beliefs would account for the gender difference in willingness to 
compete. As expected, women were less likely to choose to compete than men, with 21%, of 
women choosing the competition option, compared to 36% of men, χ2(1) = 20.62, p < .01.  
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To test whether positive beliefs about competition would account for some of this 
difference, we used responses to the Lay Beliefs about Competition Scale from the first round 
of the study. Using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013, Model 4), we calculated bootstrapped 
95% CIs for the indirect effect with 10,000 resamples. We found supporting evidence for the 
mediating role of positive beliefs measured a month prior to the competition choice, as the 
95% CI for the indirect effect did not include 0 [0.01, 0.13]. We found no supporting evidence 
for a mediating role of negative beliefs in predicting competitive behavior (95% CI: [-0.02, 
0.01]).  
Test-retest reliability. Finally, we obtained the test-retest reliability of the Lay 
Beliefs about Competition Scale, by computing the correlation coefficients between the 
responses to the scale across the two rounds. At a 1-month interval, the correlation coefficient 
for the positive beliefs subscale was r(752) = .76, p < .01, and for the negative beliefs 
subscale, it was r (752) = .73, p < .01. These reliability scores are comparable to the ones 
reported for other measures of lay theories such as those concerning beliefs about the 
malleability of personal traits (e.g., 0.71 over a 4-week period reported by Levy, Stroessner, & 
Dweck, 1998). The scale thus has satisfactory test-retest reliability.  
Discussion 
Study 3 showed that positive beliefs about competition predict competitive behaviors a 
month after their measurement, and accounted for the gender difference in competitive 
behaviors. We did not find evidence supporting the role of negative beliefs about competition 
in competitive behaviors. 
Mini Meta-Analysis of Gender Differences in Lay Beliefs about Competition 
In Studies 2 and 3, we found that compared to women, men more strongly endorse 
beliefs about the positive outcomes of competition, and this difference partially accounts for 
the gender difference in domain-general competitiveness, preference for competitive work 
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environments, and decisions to compete. The evidence did not support a gender difference in 
the endorsement of negative beliefs about competition, or the role of negative beliefs in 
explaining the gender difference in competitive attitudes and behaviors. To obtain a more 
complete picture and precise numerical estimate of the gender difference in the subcategories 
of positive and negative beliefs, we conducted a mini meta-analysis across all 6 samples in 
which we collected data on the Lay Beliefs about Competition scale as part of Studies 1, 2, 
and 3 (N = 2,331). 
Methods and Results 
We report below meta-analytic analyses assuming both fixed and random effects. We 
used both approaches because this allowed us to determine which results are robust and which 
depend on analytical choices.  
Fixed effect analyses. We initially adopted a fixed effects approach which assumes a 
fixed underlying effect size across all samples and thus assigns larger weight to larger 
samples. This approach is appropriate when identical instruments are used across studies and 
samples are relatively similar (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). 
To obtain meta-analytic effect sizes under a fixed effects assumption, we first 
computed Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988) for the gender difference in negative beliefs, positive 
beliefs, and each of their subcategories, for the fives samples from Studies 1 and 2. For Study 
3, in which the same participants completed the scale twice, we used only one effect size to 
ensure independence across samples included in the meta-analysis (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). 
This effect size was computed by averaging participant responses across the two 
measurements, as recommended by Goh, Hall, and Rosenthal (2016) and practiced in prior 
meta-analyses (e.g., Choi, Oh, & Colbert, 2015). After computing all Cohen’s ds, we 
converted them into Fisher’s zs to carry out the computations, and converted them back to 
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Cohen’s d for presentation. Descriptive statistics for each of the studies are presented in 
Tables 7a and 7b. 
Table 8 shows the meta-analyzed effect sizes and p values. The meta-analytic effect of 
gender is significant for positive beliefs, with men endorsing more positive beliefs about 
competition than do women; Cohen’s d = 0.33, p < .01. This effect holds for all subcategories 
of positive beliefs, with similar effect sizes (see Table 8).  
In contrast, the meta-analytic results did not support a gender difference in the 
endorsement of negative beliefs about competition as a whole; Cohen’s d = 0.02, p = .39. A 
closer look at individual subcategories showed a small gender difference in one subcategory: 
Men are on average more likely than women to believe that competition might encourage 
unethical behavior; Cohen’s d = 0.17. There also was a small gender difference in beliefs 
about competition’s role in hurting people’s self-esteem, with women endorsing this belief 
slightly more than men; Cohen’s d = -0.14. There was no gender difference in the 
endorsement of beliefs about competition’s role in damaging relationships; Cohen’s d = 0.02. 
Random effects analyses. We next conducted a meta-analysis adopting a fully 
random effects approach, to test the robustness of the above results. A random effects 
approach puts equal weight on each sample and is more appropriate when measurement 
instruments or sample characteristics vary across studies, such that one cannot plausibly 
assume identical true effect sizes (Borenstein et al., 2009). Although we used the same 
instrument across studies, participants had responded only to positive or only to negative 
subscales in two of the six samples (Samples 1 and 2 in Study 1), and we had found this to be 
a threat to the structural gender invariance of the positive beliefs subscale. Moreover, our 
samples varied in terms of participants’ average age, work experience, national origin, and 
geographical location, calling into question the assumption of a fixed effect size across 
samples.  
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For the random effects meta-analysis, we averaged Cohen’s d’s across the 6 samples 
and tested them against 0 in a one-sample t-test. The analysis led to nearly identical results as 
the fixed effects approach reported above, with all meta-analytic effect sizes (Cohen’s ds) 
falling within less than 0.03 points of the estimates obtained with the fixed-effects approach 
(see Table 8).  
Together, these analyses document a robust gender difference for all categories of 
positive beliefs about competition. Within negative beliefs, there emerged a smaller and less 
robust gender difference on two of the three subcategories that went in opposite directions, 
and no evidence for a gender difference on the third category regarding damage to 
relationships.  
General Discussion 
Individual differences matter for occupational choices and career success (Barrick, 
Mount, & Gupta, 2003; Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2007; Woods, & Hampson, 2010). 
Rapidly accumulating evidence suggests that competitiveness may pattern career-related 
choices and behaviors in ways that maintain and exacerbate the gender gap in economic and 
political outcomes (e.g., Bönte & Piegeler, 2013; Buser, Niederle, & Oosterbeek, 2014; 
Preece & Stoddard, 2015). These findings highlight a need to better understand the gender 
difference in competitiveness. To that purpose, we created and validated a scale measuring 
people’s lay beliefs about competition. Using this scale, we found that women are less likely 
than men to believe in the positive outcomes of interpersonal competition. We did not find 
evidence suggesting that women are more likely to believe in competition’s negative 
outcomes on the whole, even though small meta-analytic effects suggest that women are 
slightly more likely than men to believe that competition will hurt self-esteem, and men are 
slightly more likely than women to believe that competition can lead to unethical behavior. 
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We also found that positive, but not negative, beliefs about competition partially accounted 
for the gender difference in competitiveness, as measured in various ways. 
The effect we obtained for the gender difference in positive beliefs was small to 
medium sized (Cohen, 1988). This means that the distributions for women and men largely 
overlap, and we should be careful not to overstate the magnitude of the gender difference (cf. 
Hyde, 2005). At the same time, small effects can have large practical consequences if their 
effects accumulate over time or can produce critical impact (Prentice & Miller, 1992). 
Competition may be one such domain: Even if the gender difference in competitiveness or 
competition-related beliefs are not large, they may play an important role at crucial junctures 
in people’s careers and open up hard-to-close gaps (e.g., Bosquet et al., 2017). 
Theoretical and Practical Implications  
Having established that women and men differ in some of the beliefs they hold about 
competition, we can inquire after the origins of these differences: What makes men see more 
of an upside to competition than women? One possibility is that the difference is purely 
driven by the gender difference in competitiveness, and beliefs about competition are simply 
rationalizations for competitive attitudes. In other words, the causal direction may run entirely 
from competitiveness to the endorsement of competition-related beliefs. The results of the 
reverse mediational analyses in Study 2 are consistent with this possibility. In Study 3, we 
could not run a reverse mediation analysis because the outcome variable is dichotomous, and 
we again cannot rule out the possibility of the reverse causal direction. We thus acknowledge 
the possibility that lay beliefs about competition are at least partly rationalizations, consistent 
with findings that people can shift their lay beliefs strategically in line with their current 
motivations (Leith et al., 2014; Wilson & English, 2017). To address this issue more directly, 
future research may attempt to manipulate people’s lay beliefs about competition and observe 
its effects on competitiveness. 
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At the same time, there are reasons to suspect that reverse causation is not the full 
story, and lay beliefs of competition are more than post-hoc justifications. First, if people 
were simply rationalizing their competitive attitudes, it is not clear why they would do this 
only by attributing to competition more positive outcomes, but not by attributing it 
correspondingly fewer negative outcomes. Moreover, we have seen that people discriminate 
in their endorsement of distinct competition-related beliefs, as evidenced by the structural 
independence of the different belief subcategories within the same valence, as well as the 
opposite-signed gender difference in two subcategories of negative beliefs. Thus, while 
reverse causation likely explains some of the gender difference in competition-related beliefs, 
it is unlikely to be the entire explanation.  
A second reason for the gender difference in lay beliefs about competition may be that 
women and men experience competition differently, and their beliefs reflect these different 
experiences. For example, women may be less convinced that competition improves 
performance because competition really does not improve their performance as much as it 
does men’s. Some evidence already suggests that female performance does not improve and 
often suffers under competition, whereas male performance does not deteriorate and seems to 
improve (Gneezy, Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003; Morin, 2015; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2010; 
Ors, Palomino, Peyrache, 2013; Price, 2008; Weisfield, 1986). Women’s performance also 
seems to deteriorate after losing a round of competition, whereas men’s does not (Buser, 
2016; Gill & Prowse, 2014). Women’s lower scores on the Performance Increase items thus 
could well be grounded in their actual experiences with competition.  
If it is true that the different competition-related beliefs partly emerge from different 
experiences, our findings raise a number of interesting hypotheses about the gendered 
psychology of competition. Is competition a more suitable means of character development 
for males than it is for females? Is it more damaging to women’s sense of self than it is to 
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men’s? Does competition make men more creative and innovative than it makes women, but 
also lead them to engage in more unethical behaviors? The gender differences in the 
endorsement of relevant beliefs give us reason to suppose that the answers to all these 
questions may be affirmative. At the same time, it is interesting to note that women and men 
did not differ in their beliefs on the negative effects of competition on relationships, even 
though research has shown that competition is more damaging to women’s same-gender 
relationships than to men’s same-gender relationships (Lee, Kesebir, Pillutla, 2016). Overall, 
the gender differences we established supply some original hypotheses about the gendered 
experience of competition. 
A third potential explanation for the gender difference in competition-related beliefs 
lies with women and men’s differential socialization experiences around competition. Are 
there differences in how parents, teachers, and peers communicate about competition, 
winning, and losing? Are girls and boys praised differently when they win a competition, and 
consoled differently when they lose? Do male characters in children’s books present different 
attitudes toward competition than female characters (if they compete at all)? Attention to lay 
beliefs of competition could help with identifying the socialization practices that foster and 
support individual and cultural differences in competitiveness. Assessing at what age girls and 
boys begin to endorse these lay beliefs also would provide us with better insight into the 
dynamics which result in differential endorsement of competition-related beliefs. 
A fourth potential explanation for the gender difference in lay beliefs involves 
socialization histories that leave females with fewer first-hand experiences of competition. 
From an early age, girls are socialized not to compete with each other and to keep the 
appearance of equality, whereas boys openly compete and establish ranking hierarchies 
(Maccoby, 1990; Rose & Rudolph, 2006; Schneider, Benenson, Fülöp, Berkics, & Sándor, 
2011). These differences in childhood peer culture mean that females accumulate less practice 
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with overt competition—a gender gap that is compounded by their lower participation rates in 
competitive sports (Eccles & Harold, 1991). This lack of practice may prevent women from 
developing a richer understanding of competition (Dennehy, 2012). Instead, women’s beliefs, 
more than men’s, may be post-hoc rationalizations, or second-hand ideas acquired from same-
sex peers and other agents of socialization. If it is true that the gender difference in 
competition-related beliefs is partly driven by women’s lesser familiarity with competition, 
we would predict that girls who start to play competitive sports, or take on other competitive 
activities such as chess or debating, would over time develop more positive beliefs about 
competition compared to their peers who do not. Cross-cultural studies also would be 
informative in this regard, as some cultures may be more open to engaging girls in 
competitive interactions than other cultures.  
Whatever their origins, differences in lay beliefs matter because expectancies can 
create their own reality (Kirsch, 1999; Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996). For example, people 
who believe that competition boosts performance may end up performing better under 
competition via expectancy effects. Similarly, people who believe that competition builds 
character may be more graceful and resilient after a loss, and be less likely to shy away from 
another round of competition. Lay beliefs about competition may thus create positive 
feedback loops, sending people along different developmental pathways (Fischer, Knight, & 
Van Parys, 1993).  
Given their potential consequences, lay beliefs about competition are a plausible locus 
for interventions, if we grant them at least some causal role in driving people to compete, and 
if such an intervention is considered desirable. We have already reviewed the evidence linking 
the gender difference in competitiveness to the gender gap in real-world outcomes. Moreover, 
women’s reluctance to compete may be costly not just for them but also for society. 
Government agencies, private initiatives, and philanthropic organizations increasingly sponsor 
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competitions for socially desirable goals such as technological or educational innovation 
(Bays, Goland, & Newsum, 2009). If qualified women opt out of these competitions and other 
competitively structured opportunities, such as applying for grants, running for office, or 
applying for coveted professional positions, this would mean a narrowing down of the talent 
pool from which the larger society can benefit. Targeting women’s beliefs about competition 
may help avoid such individual and collective losses.  
Despite this apparent desirability of making women more competitive, we would also 
like to note that starting with the pioneering work of Deutsch (1949), scholars have raised 
questions about the value of competition and pointed to the need to consider how and why 
social structures that emphasize competition need to change (for a review, see Kohn, 1992). 
We do not subscribe to the notion that competitiveness is categorically good and women 
should strive to be more competitive. Instead, we believe that for both genders, there is value 
in developing more complex cognitions about competition and recognizing its various 
individual and societal benefits and costs. Simply filling out the Lay Beliefs about 
Competition scale may help people crystalize their beliefs about competition and trigger a 
reflective process. Such reflection would be particularly fruitful if some of the gender gap in 
the endorsement of positive beliefs stems from women’s lesser practice with competition or 
from not having given much consideration to competition’s potentially positive effects.  
At the same time, asking women to become more competitive would be unfair and 
counterproductive if women’s beliefs reflect deeper inclinations and/or actual experiences 
with competition. If competition does not help women to be more successful, more confident, 
and more creative, as it helps men, women should not be encouraged to be more competitive. 
In this case, we should deliberate how to structure our schools, organizations and societies in 
ways that will optimally motivate both genders and give them equal chances to flourish as 
individuals, become successful, and contribute to society. After all, organizations have largely 
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been formed by and for men, and organizational practices are strongly aligned with men’s 
values and preferences (Acker, 1990; Ely & Meyerson, 2000). Highly competitive structures 
may disadvantage women who are less competitive and more comfortable with flat structures 
(Nicholson, 2000), leading to suboptimal individual, organizational, and societal outcomes.  
Limitations 
Our research also has some limitations. First, our sample was limited to a Western and 
predominantly White population, living in English-speaking countries. The belief structures 
we captured are likely to be culturally bound, and we currently do not have any evidence on 
whether the structure of beliefs and their endorsement varies across cultures. More broadly, 
we need more research on the determinants of the gender difference in competitiveness and 
how it varies across cultures. 
Second, we have examined how beliefs about competition are associated with 
biological sex. An alternative and complementary approach would be linking competitive 
beliefs to the dimensions of psychological femininity and masculinity (Bem, 1974). The value 
of such an approach would be showing how competitive beliefs are related to feminine and 
masculine psychological profiles which, unlike biological sex, are non-binary.  
Third, we have studied only one aspect of beliefs about competition, namely the 
positive and negative outcomes people attribute to it. There may be other kinds of 
competition-related beliefs, which shape how people construe competitive situations and 
regulate themselves before, during, and after competition. For example, people may differ in 
whether they see competition as stressful and taxing vs. exciting and fun (cf. Brooks, 2014; 
Crum, Salovey, & Achor, 2013). They may also differ in the extent to which they believe 
competitiveness is a fixed trait or a situation-specific and malleable attribute. While we tried 
to capture the basic beliefs people hold on competition’s consequences, future research may 
extend the domain of psychologically meaningful competition-related beliefs. 
LAY BELIEFS ABOUT COMPETITION   33 
 
Fourth, our measure of competition beliefs is a self-report measure. Our findings may 
thus suffer from biases that befall self-report measures, such as social desirability and self-
generated consistency (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Future research may develop implicit 
measures of competitive attitudes which would complement self-report measures. 
Fifth, there remains a large gap between our ultimate goal of better understanding the 
gender gap in socio-economic outcomes, and what we have accomplished, namely 
documenting that women are less likely than men to attribute positive outcomes to 
competition. While our work informs the gendered psychology of competition, future research 
should delve into the meso-level mechanisms that bridge micro-level cognitions to macro-
level outcomes.  
Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion highlights that we cannot fairly and optimally structure 
social organizations and design interventions before we have a better understanding of the 
gendered psychology of competitiveness. Research aiming at such understanding should 
empirically test how women and men respond differently to competition, including the 
external factors involved in their choices to compete, as well as the effects of competition on 
their motivation, emotion regulation, performance, self-esteem, and relationships. As the field 
moves toward tackling these questions, the scale presented herein may provide a view into the 
cognitive structures that underlie variance in competitive attitudes and behaviors. A deeper 
understanding of the gender differences in competitiveness that will grow out of these 
research efforts should be the basis of more nuanced cultural conversations and more 
informed choices on how to structure our classrooms, teams, and organizations.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
List of Items in the Lay Beliefs about Competition Scale 
 
 
 
Positive Beliefs about Competition 
 
Performance Increase  
1. Competition makes people work harder (Perf1) 
2. Competition makes people perform better (Perf2) 
3. Competition helps people set goals (Perf3) 
Personal Growth 
4. Competition makes people stronger (Grow1) 
5. Competition builds character (Grow2) 
6. Competition develops self-confidence (Grow3) 
Innovation 
7. Competition prompts people to seek new solutions (Inno1) 
8. Competition encourages innovation (Inno2) 
9. Competition breeds imagination (Inno3) 
 
 
Negative Beliefs about Competition 
 
Unethical Behavior 
1. Competition leads to cheating (Ethic1) 
2. Competition encourages people to violate rules (Ethic2) 
3. Competition encourages unethical behavior (Ethic3) 
Self-Damage 
4. Competition damages self-confidence (Self1) 
5. Competition hurts self-esteem (Self2) 
6. Competition creates self-doubt (Self3) 
Relational Damage 
7. Competition creates negative feelings about others (Rela1) 
8. Competition creates enemies (Rela2) 
9. Competition divides people (Rela3) 
 
 
Table 2a 
Study 1: Results from the CFA for Positive Beliefs about Competition  
 
 df X2 X2 /df SRMR CFI RMSEA (90% CI) ∆X2 
        
Sample 1 (n = 379)        
    3-factor model 24  53.15**  2.2 .023 .99 .057 (.04, .08)  
    2-factors: Performance Increase vs. rest 26 178.59** 6.9 .050 .93 .125 (.11, .14) 125.44** 
    2-factors: Personal Growth vs. rest 26 150.79** 5.8 .045 .94 .113 (.10, .13)  97.64** 
    2-factors: Innovation vs. rest 26 76.787** 3.0 .029 .98 .072 (.05, .09)  23.64** 
    1-factor model 27 192.30** 8.0 .051 .92 .127 (.11, .14) 139.15** 
        
Sample 2 (n = 219)        
    3-factor model 24   58.16** 2.4 .042 .96 .081 (.06, .11)  
    2-factors: Performance Increase vs. rest 26 124.52** 4.8 .064 .89 .132 (.11, .16) 66.35** 
    2-factors: Personal Growth vs. rest 26 94.87** 3.6 .057 .92 .110 (.09, .13) 36.70** 
    2-factors: Innovation vs. rest 26 75.42** 2.9 .048 .94 .093 (.07, .12) 17.26** 
    1-factor model 27 127.91** 5.3 .065 .89 .131 (.11, .15) 69.75** 
        
Sample 3 (N = 132)        
    3-factor model 24 35.03 1.5 .038 .99 .059 (.00, .10)  
    2-factors: Performance Increase vs. rest 26 125.94** 4.8 .069 .88 .171 (.14, .20)  90.91** 
    2-factors: Personal Growth vs. rest 26 115.22** 4.4 .065 .89 .162 (.13, .19)  80.19** 
    2-factors: Innovation vs. rest 26 54.10** 2.1 .045 .97 .091 (.06, .12)  19.08** 
    1-factor model 27 141.13** 5.9 .074 .86 .180 (.15, .21) 106.10** 
        
Sample 4 (N = 502)        
    3-factor model 24  115.53** 4.8 .029 .97 .087 (.07, .10)  
    2-factors: Performance Increase vs. rest 26 300.60** 11.6 .050 .91 .145 (.13, .16) 185.07** 
    2-factors: Personal Growth vs. rest 26 261.76** 10.1 .049 .92 .135 (.12, .15) 146.23** 
    2-factors: Innovation vs. rest 26    135.61 5.2 .031 .96 .092 (.08, .11)  20.08** 
    1-factor model 27 316.68** 13.2 .052 .91 .146 (.13, .16)     201.15** 
Note. SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation;  
CI = confidence interval. Comparisons are made to the 3-factor model. 
** p < .01 
 
Table 2b  
Study 1: Results from the CFA for Negative Beliefs about Competition  
 
 df X2 X2/df SRMR CFI RMSEA (90% CI) ∆X2 
        
Sample 1 (n = 378)        
    3-factor model 24 59.71** 2.5  .031 .99 .063 (.04, .08)  
    2-factors: Unethical Behavior vs. rest 26 239.92** 9.2 .060 .91 .148 (.13, .17) 180.21** 
    2-factors: Self-Damage vs. rest 26 182.35** 7.0 .057 .93 .126 (.11, .14) 122.64** 
    2-factors: Relational Damage vs. rest 26 387.59** 14.9 .075 .85 .192 (.18, .21) 327.88** 
    1-factor model 27 442.12** 18.4 .077 .83 .202 (.19, .22) 382.41** 
        
Sample 2 (n = 222)        
    3-factor model 24 40.07** 1.7  .033 .99 .055 (.02, .08)  
    2-factors: Unethical Behavior vs. rest 26 114.17** 4.4 .058 .92 .124 (.10, .15) 74.10** 
    2-factors: Self-Damage vs. rest 26 108.94** 4.2 .055 .92 .120 (.10, .14) 68.88** 
    2-factors: Relational Damage vs. rest 26 143.63** 5.5 .063 .89 .143 (.12, .17) 103.57** 
    1-factor model 27 190.10** 7.9 .072 .85 .165 (.14, .19) 150.03** 
        
Sample 3 (N = 132)        
    3-factor model 24 47.24** 2.0 .035 .97 .086 (.05, .12)  
    2-factors: Unethical Behavior vs. rest 26 102.03** 3.9 .055 .91 .149 (.12, .18) 54.79** 
    2-factors: Self-Damage vs. rest 26 109.14** 4.2 .059 .90 .156 (.13, .19) 61.90** 
    2-factors: Relational Damage vs. rest 26 150.68** 5.8 .073 .86 .191 (.16, .22) 103.44** 
    1-factor model 27 176.56** 7.4 .078 .83 .206 (.18, .24) 129.32** 
        
Sample 4 (N = 502)        
    3-factor model 24   60.93** 2.5  .026 .99 .055 (.04, .07)  
    2-factors: Unethical Behavior vs. rest 26 188.69** 7.3 .046 .94 .112 (.10, .13) 127.76** 
    2-factors: Self-Damage vs. rest 26 113.90** 4.4 .035 .97 .082 (.07, .10)  52.97** 
    2-factors: Relational Damage vs. rest 26 244.80** 9.4 .050 .92 .130 (.12, .14) 183.87** 
    1-factor model 27 280.18** 11.7 .054 .90 .137 (.12, .15) 219.25** 
Note. SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CI = 
confidence interval. Comparisons are made to the 3-factor model. 
** p < .01   
 
Table 3 
Summary Table for Means and Standard Deviations across all Samples 
 
 
Study 1 
Sample 1 
Study 1 
Sample 2 
Study 1 
Sample 3 
Study 1 
Sample 4 
Study 2 
 
Study 3 
 
 n = 380 n = 219 N = 132 N = 502 N = 340 N = 758 
Positive Beliefs Subscale 
 
5.55 
(0.87) 
5.40 
(0.84) 
5.48 
(0.98) 
5.54 
(0.91) 
5.27 
(0.80) 
5.50 
(0.88) 
Performance Increase 
 
5.66 
(0.94) 
5.65 
(0.86) 
5.62 
(1.01) 
5.48 
(1.05) 
5.05 
(0.98) 
5.32 
(1.04) 
Personal Growth 
 
5.36 
(1.01) 
5.04 
(1.10) 
5.39 
(1.13) 
5.66 
(0.95) 
5.42 
(0.90) 
5.60 
(0.90) 
Innovation  
 
5.63 
(0.94) 
5.51 
(0.93) 
5.43 
(1.18) 
5.48 
(1.02) 
5.35 
(0.94) 
5.57 
(0.90) 
 n = 378 n = 222 N = 132 N = 502 N = 340 N = 758 
Negative Beliefs Subscale 
 
3.93 
(1.20) 
4.15 
(1.13) 
3.94 
(1.29) 
3.42 
(1.12) 
4.10 
(1.01) 
3.96 
(1.14) 
Unethical Behavior 
 
3.78 
(1.42) 
4.04 
(1.40) 
3.79 
(1.51) 
3.35 
(1.29) 
3.62 
(1.29) 
3.84 
(1.34) 
Self-Damage 
 
3.61 
(1.37) 
3.83 
(1.25) 
3.65 
(1.43) 
3.02 
(1.22) 
4.07 
(1.19) 
3.72 
(1.19) 
Relational Damage 
 
4.40 
(1.28) 
4.57 
(1.26) 
4.37 
(1.41) 
3.90 
(1.28) 
4.62 
(1.08) 
4.32 
(1.20) 
 
      Note. The possible range for the items is 1-7. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. Sample sizes for Samples 1 and 2 differ from 
those in Table 2a because of missing data.  
 
  
 
Table 4a  
Summary Table of Average Correlations among Scales and Subscales across all Samples 
 
 (PB) (NB) (PB-1) (PB-2) (PB-3) (NB-1) (NB-2) (NB-3) 
(PB) Positive Beliefs 
Subscale  
.91 
[.87, .93] 
       
(NB) Negative Beliefs  
Subscale 
-.42 
[-.51, -.27] 
.91 
[.88, .93] 
      
(PB-1) Performance Increase 
.90 
[.85, .92] 
-.42 
[-.47, -.29] 
.80 
[.71, .85] 
     
(PB-2) Personal Growth 
.90 
[.86, .92] 
-.39 
[-.51, -.24] 
.75 
[.62, .80] 
.84 
[.77, .87] 
    
(PB-3) Innovation 
.86 
[.83, .89] 
-.30 
[-.38, -.15] 
.66 
[.54, .71] 
.64 
[.57, .72] 
.83 
[.78, .87] 
   
(NB-1) Unethical Behavior 
-.31 
[-.39, -.18] 
.88 
[.86, .89] 
-.33 
[-.40, -.18] 
-.30 
[-.39, -.17] 
-.21 
[-.29, -.10] 
.87 
[.81, .90] 
  
(NB-2) Self-Damage 
-.47 
[-.56, -.32] 
.86 
[.84, .88] 
-.47 
[-.52, -.34] 
-.44 
[-.55, -.29] 
-.35 
[-.43, -.19] 
.62 
[.55, .66] 
.87 
[.84, .90] 
 
(NB-3) Relational Damage 
-.32 
[-.42, -.17] 
.89 
[.84, .91] 
-.33 
[-.40, -.21] 
-.29 
[-.41, -.15] 
-.23 
[-.35, -.08] 
.68 
[.59, .72] 
.67 
[.59, .72] 
.82 
[.74, .88] 
Note. Average correlations across six samples. Correlations were averaged by first transforming them to z-scores. Numbers on the diagonal are 
the average Cronbach’s alphas across the six samples, with minimum and maximum values in brackets.  
 
Table 4b  
Summary Table of Average Inter-Item Correlations across all Samples 
 
 
Note. Average inter-item correlations across six samples. Correlations were averaged by first transforming them to z-scores. Items are listed in 
Table 1. 
Perf1 Perf2 Perf3 Grow1 Grow2 Grow3 Inno1 Inno2 Inno3 Ethic1 Ethic2 Ethic3 Self1 Self2 Self3 Rela1 Rela2 Rela3 
Positive Beliefs
Perf1 1.00
Perf2 0.66 1.00
Perf3 0.58 0.55 1.00
Grow1 0.62 0.67 0.53 1.00
Grow2 0.57 0.60 0.55 0.70 1.00
Grow3 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.62 0.65 1.00
Inno1 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.47 1.00
Inno2 0.54 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.66 1.00
Inno3 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.61 0.65 1.00
Negative Beliefs
Ethic1 -0.11 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 1.00
Ethic2 -0.17 -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22 -0.13 -0.15 -0.13 0.70 1.00
Ethic3 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.22 -0.22 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 0.69 0.75 1.00
Self1 -0.24 -0.30 -0.25 -0.31 -0.29 -0.29 -0.22 -0.24 -0.21 0.49 0.50 0.51 1.00
Self2 -0.23 -0.30 -0.24 -0.31 -0.30 -0.29 -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.75 1.00
Self3 -0.19 -0.25 -0.19 -0.25 -0.25 -0.23 -0.15 -0.17 -0.16 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.67 0.67 1.00
Rela1 -0.17 -0.22 -0.19 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.14 -0.17 -0.17 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.58 1.00
Rela2 -0.11 -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.17 -0.19 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.65 1.00
Rela3 -0.12 -0.18 -0.14 -0.21 -0.21 -0.22 -0.10 -0.13 -0.12 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.60 0.64 1.00
 
Table 5  
Results of the tests for Gender Invariance of the Scale’s Factor Structure 
 
  Unconstrained 
Model 
Constrained 
Model 
Model 
Comparison 
  X2 (48) X2 (54) ∆X2 (6) p 
 
Positive Beliefs 
 Sample 1 98.30 116.76 18.46 .01 
 Sample 2 101.04 113.26 12.22 .06 
 Sample 3 70.40 73.93 3.53 .74 
 Sample 4 162.88 168.03 5.15 .52 
      
Negative Beliefs 
 Sample 1 102.47 104.15 1.68 .95 
 Sample 2 78.08 78.96 0.88 .99 
 Sample 3 115.15 117.24 2.09 .91 
 Sample 4 77.29 87.17 9.87 .13 
      
Note. In the constrained model, the factor loadings for all factors are 
constrained to be the same for both genders, whereas in the unconstrained 
model they are allowed to differ.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 6  
Study 2 – Means and Correlations among Variables 
 
Variables (Scale item range) M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Positive Beliefs (1-7) 5.27 0.80 (.86)     
2. Negative Beliefs (1-7) 4.10 1.01 -.27** (.88)    
3. Competitiveness (combined z-scores) 0.00 0.69 .42** .15** (.91)   
4. Hypercompetitiveness (1-5) 2.81 0.51 .22** .06 .66** (.84)  
5. Preference for competitive workplaces (1-7) 3.51 1.25 .18** -.06 .52** .51** (.96) 
Note. N = 327-340 due to missing data for some variables. Possible ranges for each variable are listed next to variable names. Coefficients in 
parentheses are Cronbach’s alpha values.  
** p < .01   
 
Table 7a 
Means and Effect Sizes for the Gender Difference in Positive Beliefs about Competition across all Samples 
Note: The possible range for the items is 1-7. 
 
  
 
Positive Beliefs 
(Full Scale) 
 
Performance 
Increase 
 
Personal Growth 
 
Innovation 
STUDY GENDER 
 
M 
(SD) 
Cohen’s d 
p 
 
M  
(SD) 
Cohen’s d 
p 
 
M 
(SD) 
Cohen’s d 
p 
 
M  
(SD) 
Cohen’s d 
p 
Study 1 
(Sample 1) 
Female 
(n = 164) 
 
5.42 
(0.90) d = 0.27 
p = .01 
 
5.62 
(0.95) d = 0.08 
 
 
5.18 
(1.08) d = 0.31 
 
 
5.45 
(0.96) d = 0.34 
 Male 
(n = 216) 
 
5.65 
(0.83) 
5.69 
(0.94) 
 
5.49 
(0.93) 
 
5.76 
(0.90) 
Study 1 
(Sample 2) 
Female 
(n = 105) 
 
5.28 
(0.81) d = 0.27 
p = .05 
 
5.61 
(0.87) d = 0.09 
 
 
4.86 
(1.09) d = 0.30 
 
 
5.37 
(0.84) d = 0.30 
 Male 
(n = 114) 
 
5.51 
(0.86) 
5.69 
(0.85) 
 
5.19 
(1.09) 
 
5.64 
(1.00) 
Study 1 
(Sample 3) 
Female 
(n = 60) 
 
5.31 
(1.12) d = 0.33 
p = .07 
 
5.41 
(1.15) d = 0.39 
 
 
5.15 
(1.32) d = 0.39 
 
 
5.37 
(1.22) d = 0.11 
 Male 
(n = 72) 
 
5.62 
(0.83) 
5.80 
(0.84) 
 
5.58 
(0.91) 
 
5.49 
(1.15) 
Study 1 
(Sample 4) 
Female 
(n = 242) 
 
5.35 
(0.91) d = 0.41 
p < .01 
 
5.29 
(1.02) d = 0.36 
 
 
5.50 
(0.96) d = 0.33 
 
 
5.26 
(1.02) d = 0.43 
 Male 
(n = 260) 
 
5.72 
(0.88) 
5.66 
(1.04) 
 
5.81 
(0.92) 
 
5.69 
(0.97) 
Study 2 
 
Female 
(n = 214) 
 
5.18 
(0.81) d = 0.31 
p < .01 
 
4.95 
(0.96) d = 0.29 
 
 
5.36 
(0.92) d = 0.18 
 
 
5.24 
(0.96) d = 0.31 
 Male 
(n = 126) 
 
5.43 
(0.76) 
5.23 
(0.98) 
 
5.52 
(0.86) 
 
5.53 
(0.88) 
Study 3 
 
Female 
(n = 360) 
 
5.35 
(0.94) d = 0.33 
p < .01 
 
5.15 
(1.10) d = 0.32 
 
 
5.49 
(0.97) d = 0.25 
 
 
5.41 
(0.94) d = 0.35 
 Male 
(n = 398) 
 
5.64 
(0.81) 
5.48 
(0.95) 
 
5.71 
(0.83) 
 
5.72 
(0.82) 
                  
 
Table 7b 
Means and Effect Sizes for the Gender Difference in Negative Beliefs about Competition across all Samples 
Note: The possible range for the items is 1-7.  
  
 
Negative Beliefs 
(Full Scale) 
 
Unethical 
Behavior 
 
Self-Damage 
 
Relational Damage 
STUDY GENDER 
 
M 
(SD) 
Cohen’s d 
p 
 
M  
(SD) 
Cohen’s 
d 
p 
 
M 
(SD) 
Cohen’s 
d 
p 
 
M  
(SD) 
Cohen’s d 
p 
Study 1 
(Sample 1) 
Female 
(n = 176) 
 
3.91 
(1.22) d = 0.04 
p = .73 
 
3.60 
(1.42) d = 0.24 
 
 
3.74 
(1.37) d = -0.18 
 
 
4.38 
(1.28) d = 0.03 
 Male 
(n = 202) 
 
3.95 
(1.18) 
3.93 
(1.41) 
 
3.49 
(1.37) 
 
4.42 
(1.28) 
Study 1 
(Sample 2) 
Female 
(n = 107) 
 
4.05 
(1.13) d = 0.16 
p = .22 
 
3.85 
(1.38) d = 0.27 
 
 
3.82 
(1.30) d = 0.02 
 
 
4.49 
(1.23) d = 0.13 
 Male 
(n = 115) 
 
4.24 
(1.12) 
4.22 
(1.41) 
 
3.84 
(1.21) 
 
4.65 
(1.29) 
Study 1 
(Sample 3) 
Female 
(n = 60) 
 
4.12 
(1.47) d = -0.26 
p = .14 
 
3.92 
(1.61) d = -0.16 
 
 
3.92 
(1.60) d = -0.36 
 
 
4.51 
(1.54) d = -0.18 
 Male 
(n = 72) 
 
3.79 
(1.10) 
3.68 
(1.43) 
 
3.42 
(1.24) 
 
4.25 
(1.30) 
Study 1 
(Sample 4) 
Female 
(n = 242) 
 
3.44 
(1.08) d = -0.03 
p = .75 
 
3.26 
(1.21) d = 0.14 
 
 
3.14 
(1.17) d = -0.20 
 
 
3.91 
(1.23) d = -0.02 
 Male 
(n = 260) 
 
3.41 
(1.16) 
3.44 
(1.35) 
 
2.90 
(1.25) 
 
3.88 
(1.32) 
Study 2 
 
Female 
(n = 214) 
 
4.05 
(1.01) d = 0.16 
p = .16 
 
3.48 
(1.25) d = 0.31 
 
 
4.09 
(1.21) d = -0.05 
 
 
4.57 
(1.10) d = 0.13 
 Male 
(n = 126) 
 
4.21 
(0.99) 
3.87 
(1.32) 
 
4.04 
(1.17) 
 
4.71 
(1.04) 
Study 3 
 
Female 
(n = 360) 
 
3.95 
(1.11) 
3.96 
(1.19) 
d ~ 0 
p = .93 
 
3.91 
(1.33) d = -0.12 
 
 
3.65 
(1.13) d = 0.13  
 
 
4.32 
(1.15) d ~ 0  
 Male 
(n = 398) 
 
3.75 
(1.35) 
 
3.80 
(1.25) 
 
4.32 
(1.26) 
                  
 
Table 8  
Meta-analysed Effect Sizes for Gender Differences in Positive and Negative Beliefs about Competition 
across 6 Samples (N = 2331) 
 Fixed Effects Approach  Random Effects Approach 
 Effect size p-value  Effect size p-value 95% CI 
       
Positive Beliefs 0.33 < .01  0.32 < .01 (0.26, 0.37) 
   Performance Increase 0.26   0.25  (0.11, 0.40) 
   Personal Growth 0.28   0.29  (0.22, 0.37) 
   Innovation 0.34   0.31  (0.19, 0.42) 
       
Negative Beliefs 0.02   .39  0.01   .86 (-0.15, 0.18) 
   Unethical Behavior 0.17       0.15  (-0.03, 0.33) 
   Self-Damage -0.14   -0.15  (-0.29, -0.01) 
   Relational Damage 0.02     0.01  (-0.11, 0.13) 
       
Note. We report the confidence interval for the more conservative random effects approach.  
 
Figures 
Figure 1a. Diagram and Results for CFA of Positive Beliefs about Competition  
 
 
 
  
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
     
(1) Performance Increase      
      Item 1 (p1) .81 .76 .87 .78 
      Item 2 (p2) .84 .70 .89 .81 
      Item 3 (p3) .73 .65 .67 .76 
(2) Personal Growth      
      Item 4 (p4) .85 .83 .90 .82 
      Item 5 (p5) .84 .78 .80 .86 
      Item 6 (p6) .68 .75 .81 .82 
(3) Innovation     
      Item 7 (p7) .79 .77 .81 .82 
      Item 8 (p8) .84 .73 .95 .84 
      Item 9 (p9) 
Factor correlations 
.79 .73 .75 .84 
      r12 .92 .89 .90 .94 
      r13 .83 .81 .76 .83 
      r23 .77 .69 .72 .80 
     
Note. p values for all estimates are smaller than 0.001 
 
p1 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p2 
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 7 Item 8 Item 9 
Performance 
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Figure 1b. Diagram and Results of CFA for Negative Beliefs about Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
     
(1) Unethical Behavior      
      Item 1 (n1) .89 .78 .88 .67 
      Item 2 (n2) .86 .86 .81 .84 
      Item 3 (n3) .86 .85 .85 .88 
(2) Self-Damage      
      Item 4 (n4) .87 .86 .89 .80 
      Item 5 (n5) .89 .76 .85 .87 
      Item 6 (n6) .80 .78 .85 .80 
(3) Relational Damage     
      Item 7 (n7) .84 .79 .85 .78 
      Item 8 (n8) .83 .80 .85 .79 
      Item 9 (n9) 
Factor correlations 
.73 .74 .83 .73 
      r12 .67 .70 .69 .78 
      r13 .82 .77 .78 .88 
      r23 .76 .74 .81 .81 
     
Note. p values for all estimates are smaller than 0.001 
 
n1 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 n8 n9 n2 
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 7 Item 8 Item 9 
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